

*File*  
 It was a v. useful meeting - esp. about the Ambrose.  
 We need to consider objectives carefully  
 refer for them. Who is carrying this  
 forward? / c. s.  
 1/ cc JGU  
 1/ Prime Minister (2)  
 Mark (overstated) Mgs.  
 JSH  
 4/8

Mr Greenstock

Yugoslavia: Discussion at Chevening on 3 August

You were present, along with the Danish Foreign Minister and officials, the Portuguese Foreign Minister and officials, Mr Hogg, Mr Broomfield, Mr Appleyard, Mr Ainscow, Mr Peter Hall, Mr Jay, Miss Evans, Mr Gray and others, when the Foreign Secretary held an informal meeting about future policy towards Yugoslavia, on the afternoon of 3 August at Chevening. Miss Neville-Jones of the Cabinet Office, and Mr Wall of Number 10 kindly sat in.

The meeting discussed six main topics:

- The London Conference on Yugoslavia planned for 26-28 August
- Bosnia
- Kosovo
- Sanctions against the FRY
- Humanitarian help for refugees
- Warnings against further atrocities

The main conclusions were as follows:

THE LONDON CONFERENCE ON YUGOSLAVIA

- The Conference would need to emphasise that a solution to the problems of Yugoslavia would be a long haul requiring continuous pressure.
- Interest amongst Muslim countries about the fate of Bosnia was sincere. They could not all be represented by a senior official of the Organisation of Islamic Countries. Turkey and Egypt should certainly be invited. The Secretary of State saw a good case for Saudi Arabia, not least if that country were to be encouraged to fund some of the expensive programmes which would be needed. Mr Pinheiro had doubts.

- ✓ - Japan should be asked (not least because she had money), as should China (because Dr Boutros-Ghali was keen to include all the five members of the Security Council)
- ✓ - The Conference should produce a set of principles; without them it would be a failure (Mr Pinheiro's point). If not all of the republics of the former Yugoslavia agreed to endorse the principles, the Presidency might need to issue conclusions which reflected the views of all the non-Yugoslav participants and most of the Yugoslav ones too.
- The Conference should be presented as a continuation of Lord Carrington's conference; his presence would be essential (Mr Pinheiro and Mr Ellemann-Jensen as well as the Secretary of State)

u | The conference should tackle the problem of funding of UN peacekeeping in Yugoslavia which would be raised by the UN Secretary-General. Dr Boutros-Ghali was unlikely to welcome the extra work for the UN generated by the conference, because he thought Yugoslavia a distraction; he should be helped as far as possible over money (Mr Pinheiro and Mr Ellemann-Jensen, endorsed by the Secretary of State). Mr Pinheiro and Mr Elleman-Jensen were inclined to have the EC fund most of the international peacekeeping effort in the former Yugoslavia. The Secretary of State and Mr Hogg thought that non-European countries should also contribute to what was a joint EC/UN effort.

## BOSNIA

- ✓ | - After discussion of the merits of holding open the option of the partition of Bosnia, the Ministers agreed that it was better to hold to the existing borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina provided that it could be re-organised internally to provide autonomy for Serbs, Croats and Muslims. This re-organisation required the Muslim Bosnians to be persuaded to negotiate. This conference should be used to persuade the Muslim Bosnians that they would not secure their preferred alternative to the negotiation of autonomous "Cantons" in Bosnia, namely US or UN military intervention to restore the status quo ante.

KOSOVO

- If the Kosovars revolted and were brutally suppressed by the Serbs, it would be difficult for the international community to sit back and do nothing. The Serbs must somehow be persuaded to grant the Kosovars proper autonomy.
- Effective help for the Kosovars would be much more difficult than for the Kurds in Northern Iraq because Serbian forces were already extensively deployed in Kosovo. However one could for example demand that the Serbs should not move further forces into the province.
- Because of Serbian sensitivity about Kosovo, there was a danger that international action or reaction would push the Serbs in the wrong direction. Kosovo should be treated as one of the most important subjects within the basket of issues affecting minorities in the former Yugoslavia, rather than highlighted as an issue on par with Bosnia (Mr Hall's point; the Secretary of State was against pandering to Serbian paranoia).

SANCTIONS

- The Romanians were willing to do the right thing and needed help. An EC team, probably customs officers, should be sent to Romania quickly.
- To lift the arms embargo on Bosnia alone was superficially attractive but not a good idea.

HUMANITARIAN HELP FOR REFUGEES

- If wider military action was ruled out, some greater military support for the convoys would be important, to help them negotiate their way through to their destinations. Each convoy might be accompanied by Serb and Croat officials as well as UN Agency people. There might also be scope for mine-clearance specialists joining the convoys.
- There were insufficient forces to allow the humanitarian convoys to fight their way through to their destination.

- The establishment of refugee relief zones was attractive, although the practical limits on force levels made it difficult to contemplate numerous relief zones at which the blue berets would be sufficient to protect the refugees if necessary (in addition to the usual Rules of Engagement about self-defence). Observers could play a vital role, as they had in Croatia last year.
- There was a very strong case for asking UNHCR and UNPROFOR to examine the possibilities of establishing relief zones. The first example might be Sarajevo itself where existing UNPROFOR activity could be expanded. Any new zones would have to be established in a way which was acceptable to the Agencies themselves, and the UN Secretary-General would have to be brought along.
- There was scope for melding these ideas about greater military support for convoys and refugee relief zones with American ideas which had prompted the American wish for a UN Security Council Resolution which provided for "all necessary means" to enable humanitarian help to get through to its destinations.
- The UK Presidency should issue quickly a COREU with these ideas inviting reactions.
- UNHCR's latest appeal for money had been largely successful but covered the period only up to September 92. A UNHCR mission in the next few days would return with recommendations for a further, very large appeal.

#### ATROCITIES

- The British Presidency would immediately publicise a reminder that individuals in the former Yugoslavia would be held responsible for their actions. The point would also be restated in the London Conference's "Statement of Principles". An existing Security Council Resolution set out the point well.
- The Serbs' recent offer to allow visits to alleged concentration camps should be accepted and followed up energetically.

The Secretary of State concluded by urging all to be cautious about what was said publicly on the ideas discussed at this informal meeting.

## FOLLOW-UP

Apart from the various action points included above, the Secretary of State would like to send a succinct SITREP to Number 10 before the Prime Minister and he go on holiday, in fairly shorthand style and under the headings of today's discussion. I should be grateful for a draft as soon as possible.

R. H. T. Gozney

03 August 1992

(R H T Gozney)

cc : PS

PS/Baroness Chalker

PS/Mr Hogg

PS/PUS

Mr Broomfield

Mr Appleyard

Mr Ainscow, ODA

Mr Peter Hall

Mr Jay

Miss Evans, UND

Mr Gray, EAU

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PS/No 10, Mr Wall

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