

PRIME MINISTER

MR. GORBACHEV'S VISIT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BUSH

You agreed to send a message to President Bush about your talks with Gorbachev.

The FCO have done the attached draft. It seems to me to have too much narrative and too few impressions and conclusions. I have already given Mr. Seitz a fairly full account of the talks which he has passed on to the White House. The President will be more interested in your personal impressions and conclusions.

I have therefore tried my hand at an alternative version (also attached) which you may like to consider.

CDP

Powell


(C.D. POWELL)

10 April 1989

DAIABP

thanks - on very much

Th. G. only as family
reunited - i.e. human rights.
mb

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|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES | PREM 19 | Date and sign |
| PIECE/ITEM (one piece/item number) | 2869 | |
| Extract details: | <p>Message from PM to President Bush attached to minute Power to PM dated 10 April 1989</p> |  |
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 April 1989

Dear Charles,

Mr Gorbachev's visit: Message to President Bush

/ You asked for a message for the Prime Minister to send to President Bush. As you have given a fairly full briefing to the American Chargé, the message does not go into detail on the talks but attempts to draw a few conclusions and suggest a few pointers.

Jaws.
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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OUT TELEGRAM

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
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INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH GORBACHEV: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BUSH
1. We have already given the Americans a detailed briefing on the Prime Minister's talks with Mr Gorbachev. MIFT contains a message from the Prime Minister to President Bush. Grateful you arrange earliest possible delivery.
2. See MIFT.

HOWE

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PS
PS/Mr Waldegrave
PS/PUS
Sir J Fretwell
Mr Ratford
Head Soviet Dept
Head News Dept
Head Planners

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| | | Catchword: | |
| File number LT3AAA | Dept SOVIET | Drafted by (Block capitals) S N P HEMANS | Telephone no 270 2417 |
| Authorised for despatch by: | | Initials | Date/time |
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| YYYY MAIN ADDITIONAL NNNN | File number LT3AAB | Dept SOVIET | Drafted by (Block capitals) S N P HEMANS |
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1 WAS
2 / something to be welcomed, and increasingly anxious about the war
3 of ideas. I rebutted this firmly. Perestroika would enlarge
4 human freedoms, open up East-West contacts and give the Soviet
5 people a better life. It was beginning to lead to relaxation in
6 Eastern Europe and was already having a positive influence in
7 world affairs and at the UN. All this was precisely what the
8 West wanted. The recent elections showed that the Soviet people
9 wanted it too.

10 Mr Gorbachev was cautious about economic reform in the
11 Soviet Union and particularly worried about inflation. He was
12 clearly concerned about nationality problems and said in terms
13 that the West would go back on Yalta if he gave the independence
14 movement too much leeway. Whilst agreeing that he could not
15 turn the clock back he seemed to be looking for some degree of
16 understanding from us whilst recognising that it would be
17 politically very difficult fo us to give it.

18 I told Mr Gorbachev that the basis from which we welcomed
19 perestroika was a sure defence. We were not accusing him of
20 aggressive intentions but rather following a policy which had
21 prevented war for 40 years. I did not accept his argument that
22 maintenance of nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear states
23 would encourage proliferation. He expressed eagerness to move
24 ahead and reluctance to see negotiations stalled for much
25 longer. I touched on the conventional weapons negotiations
26 in Geneva but without going into detail at this early stage. I
27 did press Mr Gorbachev on whether the Svoiet Union had been
28 telling the truth about chemical weapons stocks. He gave
29 nothing away and sought to dispose of the issue by saying the
30 problem was a lack of trust.

/// 31 He raised modernisation but did not press when I told him
// 32 that deterrence would remain a vital part of flexible response
/ 33 and that the NATO Summit would confirm our intention to
34 modernise. In his Guildhall speech he allowed himself some



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2 rather crude pressure on modernisation which I ignored in my
3 reply.
4 Twice I raised the Soviet sale of bombers to Libya but
5 elicited no response. When Geoffrey Howe raised it with
6 Shevardnadze, he diverted discussion into a comparison of
7 Eastern and Western arms supplies to the Middle East in general.
8 On the Namibia crisis, I found Mr Gorbachev understanding
9 and, I think, ready to help. I sought to get across to him that
10 the only way to put the UN Plan back on track was for SWAPO
11 forces to withdraw north of the 16th parallel in Angola. I was
12 glad to see that this has since been agreed. But it confirms
13 that the Namibian agreement is balanced on a knife-edge and
14 that, as we had all expected, the year-long transition period is
15 going to be very difficult. Continued South African cooperation
16 will be essential. So we must all work to avoid doing anything,
17 such as imposing new sanctions, which would strengthen the hand
18 of those within the South African Government who oppose the
19 settlement. This is a point which I made to Mr Gorbachev, and I
20 know that you in turn will be doing everything you can to keep
21 Congress under control.
22 We also spent some time on the Middle East. I urged him to
23 give you time to work on the Israelis. He assured me that the
24 Russians had been working hard on the Arabs and the PLO and
25 would themselves reopen relations with Israel once the peace
26 process started. I found him generally better informed on
27 regional questions than in our earlier talks and clearly
28 interested in making progress.
29 I pressed Mr Gorbachev on Central America as you had asked
30 me. He told me that he would be writing to you to say that he
31 was convinced that Castro wanted a political settlement.
32 We also had a brief but inconclusive discussion on human
33 rights.
34 I found Mr Gorbachev preoccupied and concerned but by no

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2 means anxious for his own position. My own view is that he
3 remains confident of retaining his own position through the
4 immediate future. But as the months turn into years his future
5 will depend on how far he is able to make real progress on the
6 economy. In the longer term I am concerned that the forces
7 which he has unleashed will insist on moving faster with
8 political reform not only than the so-called conservative
9 factions would wish, but also faster than Mr Gorbachev himself
10 would probably be prepared to contemplate. One conclusion which
11 I draw from this is that it will be particularly important for
12 the West, whilst welcoming increasing autonomy in Eastern Europe
13 and in the Soviet Union's own republics, not to be seen to be
14 fuelling this fire or putting an explicitly Western label on the
15 newly-won freedoms. At the same time I believe that we should
16 now be stepping up the momentum of negotiations on international
17 issues from arms control to regional issues to human rights,
18 thus ensuring that it is the Western agenda which remains firmly
19 and visibly on the table. Jim Baker's visit to Moscow next
20 month is particularly well timed in this regard.
21 Yours sincerely
22 Margaret Thatcher
23 Ends
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25 HOWE
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28 YYYY
29 PS Head Soviet Dept
30 PS/Mr Waldegrave Head News Dept
31 PS/PUS Head Planners
32 Sir J Fretwell
33 Mr Ratford Additional
34 No 10 Downing St



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