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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

16 November, 1988.

Dear Stephen,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE
AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN WASHINGTON ON WEDNESDAY, 16 NOVEMBER, 1988

In addition to her discussion with Secretary Shultz about human rights and Southern Africa, which I have recorded separately, the Prime Minister also raised a number of arms control issues. Some of what follows is very sensitive, and I should be grateful if this letter could be given only a very restricted distribution.

The Prime Minister said that she hoped the new Administration would conduct a careful review of the balance of advantage between the United States and the Soviet Union which would result from a START Agreement on the lines presently being discussed. She was uneasy about the scale of reductions in the United States submarine-launched deterrent, particularly against the background of improvements in Soviet anti-submarine warfare capability. Moreover, Soviet steps to modernise and update their ABM system round Moscow were of particular concern. There were also political factors. We had to be ready for a situation where Gorbachev failed and was replaced by an old-style Soviet leader. In such circumstances, the Soviet Union would be able to restore its armaments more quickly than the democracies. There was also the question of Soviet trustworthiness, particularly in the light of their deception over chemical weapons and their continued supply of missiles to Middle East countries. Her basic question was: would we still be safe as a result of a START Agreement? She thought the answer was probably yes, provided it was clear that there would be no further reductions beyond the 50 per cent envisaged.

Secretary Shultz said that the Prime Minister's question related principally to how a START Agreement would affect the structure of United States nuclear forces. In his view the outcome was very much to the United States' advantage, certainly compared with the likely situation were there to be no START Agreement. A higher proportion of United States warheads would be on submarine-launched missiles than was the case for the Soviet Union. This assessment had recently been confirmed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The question was rather whether a START Agreement could be achieved, given the difficulties being created by the Soviet Union over SLCMs and a number of other technical issues. He agreed with the Prime Minister, however, that it would not be prudent to go beyond 50 per cent reductions.

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
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Secretary Shultz continued that we could be confident that our plans for the 12-station bus version of Trident would not be affected by the START negotiations. Counting rules which the United States and the Soviet Union were discussing were perfectly consistent with enabling the United Kingdom to have a larger number of warheads on its Tridents.

The Prime Minister said that she remained concerned about the difficulty of verifying an Agreement to eliminate chemical weapons. Secretary Shultz said this was conceptually correct. Equally, intelligence sources had proved remarkably effective in detecting the presence of chemical weapons as well as research and manufacturing capability in countries such as Libya, Iraq and Syria. They also provided good information on the location of Soviet weapons and facilities. So while it was certainly hard to feel confident about the verification, in practice the United States had been able to detect the presence of such weapons fairly effectively. The real problem was not detection, but the lack of willingness on the part of Governments to condemn the use of such weapons where it had been proven, as in the case of Iraqi use of them against the Kurds. The current development of chemical weapons by Libya was a particular problem. There were a lot of people in Washington who believed that the United States should take out the chemical weapons facility. This was a big issue, and he was not sure what the outcome would be.

The Prime Minister said that she continued to wonder whether a limited chemical weapons capability would not give greater security than total elimination. Secretary Shultz said this would be compatible with the United States proposal for a Chemical Weapons Convention which envisaged a pause in the elimination of weapons after eight years, in order to assess the effectiveness of verification provisions. He fully shared the Prime Minister's concern about the proliferation of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles in the Middle East. The situation was nearly out of control. The Missile Technology Control Regime was a useful institution, and the Soviet Union was showing some interest in it. The United States had also been successful in derailing the planned Argentinian/Egyptian missile programme. There was 'lots cooking' in this area, and the West should work harder on it.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

C.D. Powell

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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16 November, 1988.

Dear Stephen,

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The Prime Minister had a talk with Secretary Shultz after his lunch in her honour at the State Department in Washington this afternoon. Secretary Shultz was accompanied by Mrs. Ridgway and Ambassador Price. HM Ambassador, Washington, was also present. This letter records their discussion on human rights and Southern Africa. I am recording separately their talk on arms control.

Human Rights

Secretary Shultz said that he would be meeting Dr. Sakharov later in the afternoon and would be seeking his views about the proposal to hold a human rights conference in Moscow. Sakharov's earlier comments suggested that he was setting only two criteria for such a conference: the release of political prisoners and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. He hoped to enlist Sakharov's support for setting a stiffer test and more extensive criteria.

The Prime Minister said that she just did not like the idea of having a human rights conference in Moscow. She feared that all those who had looked to the West to stand up for human rights would feel let down, and believe that we had allowed the wool to be pulled over our eyes. In her heart, she thought the Soviet system was simply incapable of implementing wholeheartedly the various steps which were necessary, above all the introduction of a genuine rule of law.

Secretary Shultz said that he felt torn on the issue. He shared the Prime Minister's scepticism whether a genuine rule of law was possible in the Soviet Union. But the Russians were talking about it. Perhaps they did not appreciate the meaning of the words. Equally, in their system, rhetoric usually did precede action. They tended to argue conceptually before doing something.

The Prime Minister said that the West would have to be careful that the Soviet Union did not go back on any promises made. This meant that guarantees of human rights must be institutionalised in law. But the thing which continued to worry her most was the fear of disappointing people in the Soviet Union and Eastern

Europe whose hopes had ridden with the West. We would have to be very firm in insisting that our criteria were met, even at some political cost in seeing to be putting obstacles in the way of better relations. Secretary Shultz said that he agreed that changes must be institutionalised. It was worth noting Dr. Sakharov's view that, in the right circumstances, a human rights conference in Moscow could actually be helpful to human rights activists. But at bottom he shared the Prime Minister's scepticism.


Angola/Namibia

Secretary Shultz briefed the Prime Minister on the progress of the negotiations for withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, basing himself on the enclosed paper. He added that it remained the American view that no one could give the Angolan Government legitimacy except Savimbi. The Soviets had played a useful role, and seemed to have told the Cubans that they were not willing to pay any more for the war in Angola. The Angolans would be unable to support it on their own. The whole thing was falling apart on their side. The Prime Minister commented that the outcome of the Geneva Meeting was a remarkable success for American diplomacy.

South Africa

The Prime Minister said that she hoped there would not be pressure from the United States for further sanctions against South Africa. There were at last some signs of movement on the situation there. Secretary Shultz said that the Administration had stood up to Congress this year. He did not expect to see the issue of sanctions back again next year: it was basically an election year issue. There was also a growing realisation that sanctions would not do much good. The Prime Minister said that the United Kingdom would continue to stand firm against sanctions. Secretary Shultz said that he had not at all given up hope for progress in South Africa. He welcomed President Botha's visits to other African States.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


C.D. Powell

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Status of Negotiations and NR in Angola

Assuming the Ad Referendum agreement on Cuban troop withdrawal reached November 15 in Geneva is approved by the Angolan, Cuban and South African governments, there will be an initialing of the interlocking agreements in Brazzaville in late November and a final signing ceremony in New York in early December. Implementation of UNSCR 435 could then be set for early February.

The Ad Referendum agreement on TCTW calls for:

- o Cuban standdown from attacks on UNITA.
- o 3,000 Cubans to depart Angola between the date of signing and the beginning of 435 implementation.
- o All Cubans to be north of the 15th parallel by 4 months after the beginning of 435 implementation and north of the 13th parallel before the 7-month mark (the date set for Namibian elections).
- o 50% of the 50,000 Cubans to have departed Angola by 7 months after 435 implementation begins and 2/3 of all Cubans to have left by 1 year.
- o 76% of all Cubans to have left by 18 months.
- o The residual Cuban presence to be no more than 12,000 at month 21 and all will have departed by month 27.

National Reconciliation

In conjunction with the likely end-of-November meeting in Brazzaville, President Sassou-Nguesso has told us that he will convene Angolan President dos Santos and other African leaders to launch a National Reconciliation process, including a ceasefire and talks between UNITA and the MPLA under African mediation. Pending achievement of NR, our support for UNITA will continue.

There is widespread support for NR, including from the Soviets and Cubans. The MPLA accepts the NR concept and, with the Geneva agreement, will now have to face putting some meat on the bones. The key issue remains the role of Jonas Savimbi. Dos Santos now appears to understand that this will have to be negotiated directly with Savimbi. (He told King Hassan of Morocco that he would agree to meet with Savimbi "under the right circumstances.")

We expect to go over the African game plan for NR with Savimbi early next week, and will be stepping up the pressure on the MPLA through African leaders committed to broker a negotiated end to the Angolan civil war.

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Chart 1 -- Current Cuban Troop Dispositions

-- This map illustrates the current location of approximately 50,000 Cuban troops in Angola. Each figure represents approximately 1, 000 Cuban troops:

-- Most Cuban troops are now located in southern Angola. Some 18,000 are concentrated in southwestern Angola on the border with Namibia. This powerful force is equipped with advanced armor, artillery, attack aircraft, and air defense weapons;


-- Cuban troops are also located at Cuito Cuanavale in southeastern Angola, the traditional jump-off point for offensives by the military forces of the Luanda government (FAPLA) against UNITA's strongholds at Mavinga and Jamba:

-- Cuban forces are also deployed on two East/West lines: one in southern Angola from the port of Naimbe to Cuito Cuanavale and one in central Angola along the line of the Benguela Railway;

-- Small detachments of Cuban troops are located at Luanda, in the oil-producing Cabinda enclave, and at certain scattered locations in northern Angola;

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Chart # 3 -- D-Day + 4 Months

-- Four months into the Cuban withdrawal process, the situation will already have shifted dramatically in favor of UNITA:


-- The Cuban exclusion zone will include all of Angola south of parallel 15. This would compel Cuban evacuation of their current positions in southwestern Angola.

-- More importantly, it would compel Cuban evacuation of Cuito Cuanavale, the traditional jump-off point for Cuban offensives against UNITA.

-- In addition to removing Cuban logistical and advisory support, the departure of Cuban troops will erode FAPLA morale and undermine the psychological climate for offensive action against UNITA.

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Chart #2 -- Pre D-Day


-- This and subsequent charts depict the impact of Cuban troop withdrawal on UNITA's strategic situation.

-- The term D-Day refers to the date for the formal beginning of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and implementation of the UN plan for independence in Namibia;

The parties have agreed that 3000 Cuban troops will depart Angola before D-Day.

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Chart # 4 -- D-Day = 7 Months

-- Seven Months into the withdrawal process, Cuban troops would be effectively removed as a factor in the UNITA-MPLA military equation;

-- A total of 25,000 Cuban troops (1/2 of the Cuban troops now in Angola) will have left for Cuba;


-- Remaining Cuban troops will be excluded from all Angolan territory south of parallel 13. Thus, no Cuban troops would be permitted within hundreds of kilometers of UNITA's key strongholds;

-- In order to provide security for their continuing withdrawal, Cuban troops would almost certainly be concentrated at the ports of Lobito and Benguela, thus further increasing the distance between them and UNITA base areas;

-- With no Cuban presence at all in southern Angola, UNITA would be free to take on FAPLA on extremely favorable terms. This shift in the military balance would generate overwhelming pressure on the MPLA to negotiate an end to the civil war with UNITA.

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
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Chart #5 -- D-Day + 12 months

-- At 12 months into the withdrawal process, 33,000 Cuban troops (66% of all Cuban troops now in Angola) will have left for Cuba;

-- The remaining 17,000 Cuban troops will remain confined north of parallel 13

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Chart # 6 -- D-Day + 18 months


--At 18 months into the withdrawal process, 38,000 Cuban troops will have left for Cuba.

--The dwindling number of Cuban troops remaining in Angola will continue to be confined north of parallel 13 and would have a negligible impact on the country-wide UNITA-MPLA military balance.

--The departure of all remaining Cuban troops would take place over the next nine months.


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