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NATO SUMMIT: 3 MARCH 1988

SUMMARY

1. SUMMIT DECLARATION ADOPTED. A FULL AND THOUGHTFUL DEBATE ON EAST WEST RELATIONS REVEALED A BROAD IDENTITY OF VIEWS. IT CONCLUDED WITH A MOVING EXTEMPORE INTERVENTION BY PRESIDENT REAGAN WHICH BROUGHT THE MEETING TO AN END ON A NOTE OF CONFIDENCE AND UNITY.

DETAIL

2. AFTER THE SUMMIT DECLARATION HAD BEEN FORMALLY ADOPTED, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OPENED A DEBATE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS. LUBBERS (NETHERLANDS), HAVING EMPHASISED THAT THE ALLIANCE MUST PROVE ITSELF READY TO DEFEND ITSELF AND THAT NEW DEFENCE CONCEPTS WERE NEEDED, SAID THAT IT WAS UP TO THE ALLIANCE TO EXPLOIT EAST WEST CONTACTS IN THE HUMANITARIAN, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FIELDS TO THE MAXIMUM IN THE INTERESTS OF HUMANISING COMMUNIST SOCIETIES. PERESTROIKA WAS INTENDED BY ITS AUTHORS TO REALISE THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM: BUT ITS INSTRUMENT, GLASNOST, COULD BE HELPFUL TO US IN OTHER AREAS SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROMOTION OF THE FREE FLOW OF IDEAS. THERE WAS ALSO WORK TO BE DONE IN THE WEST, FOR EXAMPLE IN OVERCOMING UNEMPLOYMENT OF YOUNG PEOPLE WITHOUT VOCATIONAL TRAINING. THE NEW ECONOMIC DYNAMISM OF WESTERN EUROPE SHOULD BE USED TO OVERCOME THE UNNATURAL DIVISION OF EUROPE. HE WAS GREATEFUL TO REAGAN AND SHULTZ FOR THE INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS IN THE ALLIANCE. BUT INTERNATIONAL TRADE, MONETARY AND DEBT PROBLEMS SHOULD BE TACKLED IN A MORE CO-ORDINATED WAY.

3. KOHL (GERMANY) SAID HE WAS VERY SATISFIED. JOINT EFFORTS HAD PRODUCED 'TWO VERY ACCEPTABLE JOINT DOCUMENTS'. THE FACT THAT 16

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HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WERE AGREED WOULD MAKE A BIGGER IMPRESSION ON THE KREMLIN THAN ON THE WESTERN PRESS. WE SHOULD SELL THE RESULTS STRONGLY IN THE WEST: AND THEY WOULD STRENGTHEN AMERICA'S HAND AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD HAVE THE STRENGTH TO CONFRONT THE EAST WITH THE ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS THAT PRE-OCCUPIED US. WEAPONS THEMSELVES WERE NEUTRAL: IT WAS PEOPLE'S INTENTIONS THAT WERE GOOD OR EVIL. THERE WERE TWO TRENDS OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE FRG: ONE THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION, THE OTHER THAT EVERYTHING HAD CHANGED. THEY WERE EQUALLY WRONG. GORBACHEV HAD MADE CLEAR THAT HIS INTENTION WAS NOT TO WORK FOR A PLURALIST SOCIETY, BUT TO MAKE THE SOVIET SYSTEM MORE EFFECTIVE. WE SHOULD WAIT, KEEP CALM, AND CHERISH NO ILLUSIONS.

4. MILITARY STRENGTH WAS CENTRAL TO OUR FREEDOM, AND GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION HAD ACCEPTED THE EXTENSION OF CONSCRIPTION TO 18 MONTHS. BUT THE WEST WAS OFTEN TOO SCEPTICAL ABOUT ITS OWN STRENGTHS. HE WAS GLAD THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SHULTZ HAD SPOKEN ABOUT SOVIET JEWS AND GERMANS WANTING TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION: THERE WERE 2 MILLION PEOPLE IN EITHER GROUP. WE SHOULD PLEAD FOR FREEDOM OF RELIGION, IN THE MILLENNIUM OF CHRISTIANITY IN RUSSIA AND AT A TIME WHEN 10 BISHOPRICS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA WERE VACANT. THE SOVIET UNION NATURALLY DOMINATED THE WARSAW PACT, BUT THERE WERE VARIOUS STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE WHICH WE SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE. PERHAPS THE EC SHOULD GIVE A BONUS TO THOSE COUNTRIES THAT WERE FURTHER DEVELOPED, FOR EXAMPLE HUNGARY. THERE HAD BEEN SOME PROGRESS WITH THE GDR. THE WALL AND THE FRONTIER FORTIFICATIONS HAD NOT DISAPPEARED, BUT MORE THAN 3 MILLION CITIZENS HAD VISITED THE FRG, 1 1/2 MILLION OF THEM FOR THE FIRST TIME. THE IMPACT ON A COUNTRY OF 17 MILLION INHABITANTS MUST BE ENORMOUS. THERE WAS NO REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE TO ALLIANCE POLICIES. THE WEST SHOULD NOT WITHDRAW BY ONE MILLIMETRE. OUR STRONGEST CAPITAL WAS THE IDEA OF FREEDOM. THIS WOULD APPEAL TO THE NEW, YOUNG GENERATIONS IN BERLIN AND PRAGUE. IF WE MAINTAINED OUR DEFENCES, WE COULD LOOK TO THE FUTURE WITH CONFIDENCE.

5. FOR THE UK, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THE SUMMIT HAD ACHIEVED 'A VERY, VERY GOOD DECLARATION.' WHEN SHE FIRST MET GORBACHEV, SHE HAD ESTABLISHED A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE BY TELLING HIM THAT ALTHOUGH OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAD TOTALLY DIFFERENT SYSTEMS, EACH COULD TALK TO THE OTHER ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL RESPECT AND OF RECOGNITION THAT EACH HAD A RIGHT TO A STRONG DEFENCE OF ITS OWN SYSTEM. SHE HAD WARNED GORBACHEV NOT TO TRY TO DETACH THE UK FROM THE U S OR NATO: EQUALLY, WE WOULD NOT TRY TO DETACH MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT. THE PRIME MINISTER CONTINUED THAT IN THE WEST OUR FREE SYSTEM LED TO

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GREATER ECONOMIC STRENGTH, WHICH IN TURN PRODUCED GREATER MILITARY STRENGTH. IN THE CASE OF THE SOVIET UNION, GREAT MILITARY STRENGTH WAS ALL THEY HAD, BASED ON AUTHORITARIANISM AND COMPULSORY SACRIFICES BY ORDINARY PEOPLE (THOUGH THE LATTER MIGHT SOMETIMES TAKE PRIDE IN THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF THEIR COUNTRY). HOWEVER, GORBACHEV HAD REALISED THAT CHANGE WAS ESSENTIAL AND INEVITABLE. IT WAS THEREFORE POSSIBLE FOR THE WEST TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL STRENGTH, RESPECT AND HARD WON AND HARD NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS. WE SHOULD KEEP OUR FRIENDS AND KNOW OUR ENEMIES. WE SHOULD NEVER BE AFRAID OF STRENGTH, BUT ONLY OF WEAKNESS.

6. MRS THATCHER CONTINUED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR GORBACHEV'S POSITIVE INITIATIVES, AND TO PAY TRIBUTE WHEN HE APPEARED TO MAKE A WELCOME MOVE (EG ON AFGHANISTAN). MEANWHILE, MAINTENANCE OF OUR DEFENCES WOULD PROTECT US AGAINST ANY FUTURE TURN FOR THE WORSE IN SOVIET POLICIES. SHE BELIEVED GORBACHEV'S DOMESTIC POSITION WAS SECURE. IN ANY PERIOD OF CHANGE, CRITICISM WAS BOUND TO COME FIRST, AND THE BENEFITS ONLY LATER. HOWEVER, SOVIET EXTERNAL POLICIES CONTINUED ACTIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE GULF, IRAN-IRAQ, ARAB-ISRAEL, ANGOLA, ETHIOPIA, SOMALIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. INTERNALLY, THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY HAD ITS VESTED INTERESTS. THERE WERE STILL PEOPLE IN PSYCHIATRIC WARDS, THERE WERE STILL POLITICAL PRISONERS AND THE EMIGRATION OF JEWS WAS BEING PERMITTED ON A CAREFULLY CALCULATED BASIS. BUT SOVIET POLICIES WERE CHANGING IN THE FACE OF THE VIGOROUS WESTERN APPROACH. THE WEST HAD TO BE EQUALLY ACTIVE IN PREACHING ITS VALUES, PRESSING ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND NOT LIMITING CONTACTS TO ARMS CONTROL. WE SHOULD STRESS THAT OUR AID TO THE THIRD WORLD BOTH HELPED THOSE COUNTRIES ECONOMICALLY AND LEFT THEM WITH THEIR FREEDOM. SHE BELIEVED WE WERE ENTERING A NEW, MORE HOPEFUL CHAPTER. WE SHOULD BASE OURSELVES ON SURE DEFENCE, EAST WEST MUTUAL RESPECT, HARD NEGOTIATIONS AND A BELIEF IN FREEDOM.

7. MRS BRUNDTLAND (NORWAY) SAID THAT SINCE SO MUCH DEPENDED ON EAST WEST DIALOGUE THE WHOLE WORLD LOOKED TO THE ALLIANCE. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO CONSULT WITH THE AIM OF ACHIEVING THE WIDEST POSSIBLE COMMON VIEW. THE DECLARATION WAS A GOOD BASIS FOR FUTURE PROGRESS. SHE AGREED WITH MRS THATCHER ON THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE EAST WEST DIALOGUE, TO WHICH SHE WOULD ADD ECONOMIC, TRADE AND ECOLOGICAL ISSUES. BOTH GORBACHEV AND RYZHKOV (ON THE LATTER'S VISIT TO NORWAY) SHOWED COMMON, LOGICAL AND DETERMINED POLICIES. SHE AGREED WITH KOHL THAT WE SHOULD NOT UNDER-ESTIMATE WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN THE SOVIET UNION. MUCH HAD CHANGED, AND IT WAS IN OUR INTEREST TO HELP MATTERS ALONG.

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8. OZAL SAID THAT TURKEY'S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE SHOWED THAT STRENGTH AND SOLIDARITY WERE THE KEY TO DEALING WITH THE RUSSIANS. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME TO CHANGE FUNDAMENTALLY. SINCE IT WAS A MULTINATIONAL EMPIRE, MANY NEW VOICES WOULD BE HEARD. IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO SUPPORT A POLICY OF OPENNESS, WHICH COULD LEAD TO BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE WEST. THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM HAD REACHED THE LIMITS OF ITS ECONOMIC POTENTIAL. THE WEST SHOULD TRY TO FIND A WAY TO PREVENT BLOODSHED AFTER THE RUSSIANS HAD LEFT AFGHANISTAN. ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO TEHRAN, TWO MISSILES FIRED FROM IRAQ HAD EXPLODED IN THE CITY. THE RUSSIANS WERE MAKING MONEY FROM BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN BY SELLING THEM MISSILES. IT WAS NECESSARY TO FIND A REASONABLE SOLUTION TO THIS WAR, OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE AN INCREASED DANGER TO THE ISLAMIC WORLD FROM FUNDAMENTALISTS. TURKEY WAS CULTIVATING GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES. HE HOPED THAT THE NEW ERA WITH GREECE WOULD CONTINUE. THERE HAD RECENTLY BEEN SUBSTANTIAL DEVELOPMENTS AMONG THE BALKAN COUNTRIES.

9. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND SAID THAT FRANCE FULLY ACCEPTED THE DECLARATION. 'NONS SOMMES SOLIDAIRES' SHE REMAINED AN ACTIVE AND LOYAL ALLY IN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE ALLIANCE. IN THE MILITARY SPHERE, SHE WOULD CONTINUE TO COLLABORATE WITH HER ALLIES BUT WOULD REMAIN OUTSIDE THE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE AND WOULD CONTINUE WITH HER AUTONOMOUS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY. GORBACHEV WAS A LOYAL MARXIST LENINIST, BUT HE WAS MOVING INTO UNMAPPED TERRITORY NOW THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION HAD PASSED AWAY. HE HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE WEST, THEREFORE OUR ACTIONS WOULD HAVE AN EFFECT ON HIS DECISIONS. CHANGES WERE TAKING PACE, NOT IN SOVIET DOCTRINES BUT IN SOVIET PRACTICE. GORBACHEV WAS TAKING RISKS, FOR THEIR DEALINGS WITH HIM THE ALLIES WOULD NEED LOYALTY, STRENGTH AND FLEXIBILITY. GORBACHEV HAD SIGNALLED TO MITTERRAND IN ADVANCE HIS INTENTION TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN, BUT HIS ACTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE VERIFIED IN PRACTICE: NOTHING HAD HAPPENED YET. IN ARMS CONTROL, THE NEED FOR VERIFICATION WAS EXPRESSED IN THE 'EXCELLENT' INF TREATY. GORBACHEV WAS NO GANDHI: BUT WE SHOULD SEIZE OUR OPPORTUNITIES. IF WE WERE WRONG, WE COULD ALWAYS RETRIEVE THE SITUATION. IF WE WERE RIGHT, WE SHOULD BE ARCHITECTS OF PEACE.

10. MARTENS (BELGIUM) SAID THE WEST MUST REMAIN UNITED AT THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS. THE CSCE FINAL ACT HAD OPENED A NEW ERA IN EAST WEST RELATIONS.

11. MULRONEY (CANADA) COMPARED THE SOVIET RECORD FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO AFGHANISTAN WITH THAT OF THE U S AS AN EXEMPLARY NEIGHBOUR OF CANADA.

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12. PRESIDENT REAGAN (U S), SPEAKING EXTEMPORE, SAID THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS UNIQUE IN WORLD HISTROY. IN THE PAST, VICTORY SETTLEMENTS HAD USUALLY SET THE PATTERN FOR THE NEXT WAR. BUT WORLD WAR II HAD LED TO THE CREATION OF A SUCCESSFUL AND POWERFUL ALLIANCE. ONE OF THE WAR-TIME ALLIES STOOD ALONE AS A POSSIBLE CAUSE OF A NEW WAR, OWING TO ITS ADOPTION OF AN EXPANSIONIST PHILOSOPHY DERIVED FROM MARX. IF THE WEST WAS THE ENEMY OF THE SOVIET UNION, IT WAS BY THE CHOICE OF THOSE WHO ASPIRED TO WORLD CONQUEST. GORBACHEV WAS THE FIRST SOVIET LEADER WHO HAD NOT REITERATED HIS BELIEF IN A SINGLE WORLD COMMUNIST STATE: BUT MORE THAN THAT WOULD BE NEEDED BEFORE THE ALLIANCE COULD RELAX ITS EFFORTS.

13. THE ALLIANCE REPRESENTED MORE PEOPLE AND GREATER ECONOMIC STRENGTH THAN THE SOVIET UNION. THE FATE OF THE WORLD WAS LITERALLY IN OUR HANDS. ALL WE HAD TO DO WAS TO STAY UNITED. CONTRARY TO MEDIA QUESTIONS, HE HAD FOUND NO GREAT DIFFERENCES IN THE ALLIANCE. IT WAS ABSOLUTELY UNTRUE THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS TRYING TO SEPARATE ITSELF: ITS DESTINY WAS BOUND UP WITH THE ALLIANCE. A BOMB DROPPED ON AMSTERDAM WOULD BE THE SAME AS A BOMB DROPPED ON CHICAGO: IF WE ALL MAINTAINED THIS ATTITUDE, THE BOMB WOULD NOT BE DROPPED. HE FELT HIMSELF IN THE PRESENCE OF A MIRCALE. PROVIDED WE STAYED AROUND THE TABLE AND STAYED UNITED, WE WOULD BE THE HOPE OF THE WORLD AND THE PROMISE OF PEACE. A SOVIET DESERTER FROM AFGHANISTAN HAD TOLD HIM HOW PEOPLE IN THE SOVIET UNION PLACED THEIR HOPES ON US. AS LONG AS THE ALLIANCE DID ITS DUTY BY KEEPING UP ITS STRENGTH AND ITS UNITY THERE WOULD BE NO DANGER OF WAR. THE U S WOULD STAY WITH THE ALLIANCE UNTIL THE PEACE THAT WE WANTED HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. PRESIDENT REAGAN CONCLUDED BY PAYING TRIBUTE TO LORD CARRINGTON FOR HIS EXEMPLARY STEWARDSHIP OF THE ALLIANCE.

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