



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

You will also
wish to thank
him for the gift

11 April 1986

of vodka and caviar.
Dear Charles,

CDP 12/6. MB

Soviet Ambassador's Farewell Call

Thank you for your letter of 7 April. I enclose a brief for Mr Popov's farewell call on the Prime Minister at 1015 on 14 April; it has not been seen by the Foreign Secretary, but will be submitted to him in parallel tonight.

The Foreign Secretary considers it particularly important that we should use Popov's farewell calls to continue the process of establishing ourselves in Soviet eyes as independent interlocutors with views of our own (as well as with influence in Washington).

Popov is unlikely himself to raise any significant points of substance. Nor would we expect Popov's report of this call to carry much weight in Moscow; it will be the initial reports of his (much weightier) successor Zamyatin that will matter. It would therefore be best to leave for Zamyatin any hints about a Prime Ministerial visit to Moscow.

Nevertheless, we have suggested in the brief that the Prime Minister should remind Popov of the stark contrast between his farewell calls here and those of Sir Iain Sutherland from Moscow (the latter was lunched by a Deputy Minister and was given the minimum protocol call at the Supreme Soviet). And only last month Sir Bryan Cartledge was unable to see Shevardnadze to deliver the Prime Minister's reply to Gorbachev, but had instead to call on a First Deputy Minister. We also recommend that the Prime Minister raise some of the impediments to better UK/Soviet relations, notably human rights.

We have referred briefly to the need for a more serious approach to arms control, with less propaganda: Mr Karpov, the Soviet Union's Geneva negotiator, will be in London on 18 April for arms control talks with FCO officials.

Another issue worth touching on is the possibility of a Soviet/Argentina fisheries agreement covering part of the Falklands fisheries zone. A brief reference to this by the Prime Minister would indicate the importance we attach to the matter: a separate brief and background note are attached.

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In Popov's favour is the fact that Anglo-Soviet relations have improved a good deal since his arrival in 1983, and it is fair to assume that his recommendations must have done something to encourage Gorbachev to come here in 1984 (though he has failed to persuade either Gromyko or Shevardnadze to do the same).

He prides himself in particular on his activities in the commercial field (he may have been behind the goal of 40-50% increase in trade mentioned by Gorbachev to British businessmen). He is likely to speak of disappointing results, blaming uncompetitive UK prices and financing terms. In fact trade declined in 1985, in comparison with the quirkily high figures for 1984, reflecting the uneven rhythm imposed by their Five Year Plan.

Yours ever
Tony Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

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FAREWELL CALL BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR ON PRIME MINISTER

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Aware of your efforts to help improve UK/Soviet relations. They have borne some fruit. Pleased with Gorbachev's visit here: greetings to him. Sorry we have not seen Shevardnadze here in your time.
2. However, some unnecessary impediments to relationship. First, sense that Russians not treating UK with sufficient seriousness. Contrast your programme of farewell calls with extreme discourtesy of Soviet side to Sir Iain Sutherland in June 1985 - not a single call on anyone of political weight. Acknowledge Sir Bryan Cartledge has done better, but last month unable to deliver to Shevardnadze my letter to Gorbachev. Have to say that such matters bound to affect way in which Soviet Ambassador here will be treated.
3. Second impediment, Soviet behaviour towards individuals. Of closest concern to UK small number of outstanding marriage cases where partner unable to leave Soviet Union. Wait of several years is norm: an area where we hope Gorbachev's call for change and greater efficiency - and words about solutions in a humane spirit - will have an impact.
4. Of wider concern, Soviet behaviour towards own citizens who do not conform. Every society has criminals who should - humanely - be punished. But when we hear of an imprisoned Ukrainian poetess, Mrs Ratushinskaya, whose offense was clearly to write Christian poetry, or of another for being an unofficial teacher of Hebrew, we question standards of civilised behaviour by which Soviet

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Union wishes to be judged in other areas. Should be recognised by your leaders as a [redacted] block on Soviet ability to win trust in West.

5. Third impediment is Soviet urge to public diplomacy. When even Patriarch of Russian Orthodox Church writes to Archbishop of Canterbury about Gorbachev's 15 January proposals, seems like PR campaign rather than serious attempt to engage Western leaders. What people in West want to see is progress at negotiating table, eg at Geneva. Yet in one major area where elements of agreement - on strategic weapons - US still have no reply on 2 November proposals. 15 January proposals were not a reply.

6. Widespread non-reaction to Gorbachev's 27 March suggestion of immediate Summit on nuclear tests (when Soviet position has emphasised need for long and careful preparation of such meetings) shows credibility overstretched.

7. Still much cause for hope~~f~~. Common interests in security at lowest possible balanced level of weapons. Noted interesting recent formulations by Gorbachev on peaceful coexistence; more of spirit of live and let live; and on verification. Note Soviet confirmation that US/Soviet Summit should go ahead (but attempts to exert pressure through not agreeing date misconceived).

8. Believe greater mutual understanding vital - and achievable. For your successor to indicate whether Soviet Union willing to allow development of UK/Soviet relations to play part in this. For my part, ready.



PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR: 14 APRIL 1986

Argentine/Soviet Fisheries Negotiations

- Concerned to hear of your negotiations with Argentina could be source of serious disagreement between us. What is the position?

[If Ambassador Popov unable to confirm such negotiations do not purport to cover Falklands water]

- Our efforts since 1982 to reduce tension and promote international cooperation.
- A Soviet/Argentine agreement with such provision would have no validity in international law.
- Our concerns made known to you since last November. So Soviet action on these lines would be unfriendly and irresponsible.
- Sharply at variance with Soviet role in Antarctic Treaty and in Convention for Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources [covers South Georgia].
- Must ask Soviet Government to reconsider.
- [If necessary] will take up soon with Zamyatin.



BACKGROUND

1. In November Russians and others denied they were negotiating with Argentina (Secretary of State's minute (PM 85/104 of 17 December) to the Prime Minister). They probably were not, at that time. We made clear to Russians our view that any such agreement would have no validity in international law and would be politically irresponsible. But recent reports (some secret) indicate negotiations between Soviet Union and Argentina have made considerable progress: Americans think agreement could be announced "sooner rather than later". On 8 April the Russians could offer no clarification to Sir W Harding. He said Popov should do so on 14 April.

2. Unclear what geographical area agreement covers. Likely to be Argentine Exclusive Economic Zone - a term that is interpreted by Argentina to cover waters within 200 miles of Falklands and of South Georgia and of Argentina's Antarctic claim (which overlaps largely with ours): ie waters that we have a right to claim as a fisheries zone in respect of our sovereignty over Falklands.