

ADVANCE COPIES

17

MIDDLE EAST

PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR FERGUSSON
MR EGERTON
HD/WENAD
HD/MED
HD/UND
HD/CONSULAR DEPT
PUSD (2)
NEWS DEPT
RESIDENT CLERK

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE DIO

IMMEDIATE

15.11.84

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 011935Z MAY 85
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1446 OF 1 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, TUNIS, BONN (FOR SECRETARY OF
STATE'S PARTY)
ROUTINE DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD, JERUSALEM, JEDDA, ALGIERS, BEIRUT,
UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW.

AMMAN TELNO 173: ARAB/ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. MURPHY'S TRIP NEITHER A SUCCESS NOR A FAILURE. US FACING
DIFFICULT DECISIONS TO BE TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF SHULTZ'S TALKS
WITH KING HUSSEIN.

DETAIL

2. MINISTER CALLED ON MURPHY THIS MORNING TO REVIEW THE WAY AHEAD.
MURPHY SAID THAT HE WAS DESCRIBING HIS TRIP AS NEITHER A SUCCESS
NOR A FAILURE. HE HAD REPORTED TO SHULTZ, WHO INTENDED TO SUBMIT
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT AFTER HIS OWN TRIP TO THE MIDDLE
EAST. HIS TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE CRUCIAL. SHULTZ WAS
LOATH TO ACCEPT THAT THE US SHOULD TAKE OVER THE LEADING ROLE
IN THE PEACE PROCESS. HE BELIEVED THAT US ALOOFNESS HAD
STIMULATED GREATER REALISM IN JORDAN AND ELSEWHERE. HE WOULD HAVE
TO BE SATISFIED OF KING HUSSEIN'S REAL COMMITMENT TO TAKING THE
HARD DECISIONS ON THE ARAB SIDE THAT WOULD BE NEEDED IF ANY
NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO HAVE A CHANCE OF SUCCESS BEFORE HE RECOMMENDED
THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN SHOULD TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE. HANNAY
SAID THAT THE KING WOULD NO DOUBT BE SEEKING THE COMMITMENT
TO HARD DECISIONS FROM THE AMERICANS. THERE COULD EASILY BE A
RECIPE HERE FOR TALKING PAST EACH OTHER. MURPHY SAID THIS POINT
WAS UNDERSTOOD IN WASHINGTON BUT SHULTZ WOULD BE VERY CAUTIOUS.

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3. KING HUSSEIN WAS ASKING THE AMERICANS TO TAKE SOME VERY DIFFICULT DECISIONS. HE INSISTED THAT HE NEEDED AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AT THE OUTSET OF THE PROCESS AS AN UMBRELLA FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. THE ESSENTIAL POINT FOR THE JORDANIANS WAS THAT ALL THE PARTIES SHOULD BE INVITED AND NONE EXCLUDED EXCEPT BY THEIR OWN CHOICE. MURPHY STILL BELIEVED THAT THIS RISKED KILLING THE PROCESS RIGHT AWAY. IT RAISED PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH THE US/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND ALSO THE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF PLO REPRESENTATION. KING HUSSEIN'S AIM WAS PRESUMABLY TO LESSEN THE RISK FROM DAMASCUS.

4. KING HUSSEIN ALSO INSISTED THAT THE PLO SHOULD BE COMMITTED TO ANY PROCESS THAT WAS AGREED AND HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO SIGN WHATEVER WAS NEGOTIATED. HE WAS TIRED OF GETTING BETWEEN THE PLO AND THE US. MURPHY COMMENTED THAT US/PLO NEGOTIATIONS REMAINED OUT OF THE QUESTION UNTIL THE PLO SATISFIED THE LONG-STANDING US CONDITIONS. THE RECENT INTERCEPTION OF THE BOAT-LOAD OF FATAH GUERRILLAS OFF THE ISRAELI COAST HAD NOT HELPED TO CONVINCED WASHINGTON THAT THE PLO HAD CHANGED ITS SPOTS. NOR COULD THE ISRAELIS BE PERSUADED TO DEAL WITH THE PLO. UNLESS THEREFORE KING HUSSEIN COULD PERSUADE THE PLO TO STAND ASIDE, AT LEAST IN THE INITIAL STAGES, NO PROGRESS WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

5. MURPHY SAID THAT THE PROPOSAL THAT HE SHOULD MEET A JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN DELEGATION, WHICH HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD IN RESPONSE TO PRESSURE FROM CAIRO, HAD RATTLED THE PLO WHO SEEMED TO BELIEVE IT A RECIPE FOR CORPORATE SUICIDE. THEY FEARED IT WOULD SET A PRECEDENT FOR PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AT FUTURE MEETINGS AND IN DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. HE BELIEVED THAT SOME PLO MEMBERS NEVERTHELESS WANTED TO TAKE THE CHANCE OF GOING AHEAD. IN MURPHY'S VIEW IT WAS THE ONLY WAY TO GET THE PROCESS STARTED. MURPHY SAID THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD PROPOSED THAT THE SENIOR PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD BE THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PNC AND HAD SEEMED CONFIDENT THAT HE COULD GET THE PLO TO AGREE. (MURPHY EMPHASISED THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS SENSITIVE AND SHOULD BE CAREFULLY PROTECTED.) SHULTZ WOULD NOT DECIDE ON THE ACCEPTABILITY OF ONE INDIVIDUAL OR ONE MEETING IN ISOLATION BUT WANTED A CLEARER IDEA OF HOW THE ARAB SIDE SAW THIS MEETING AS LEADING TO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS. THE US RESPONSE WOULD BE DECIDED IN THE LIGHT OF SHULTZ'S TALK WITH KING HUSSEIN.

6. MURPHY SAID THAT THE PALESTINIANS HE HAD MET IN JERUSALEM HAD TALKED, ALMOST AS IF ON INSTRUCTIONS, OF THE NEED FOR A NEW US STATEMENT ON PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION. THEY HAD SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE COINED IN TERMS OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE CONTEXT OF CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN. BUT THIS SUBJECT HAD NOT COME UP AT ALL IN HIS LAST TALK WITH KING HUSSEIN IN AQABA. SUCH A US STATEMENT WAS NOT IMPOSSIBLE AT THE RIGHT TIME. BUT SHULTZ WOULD NOT AGREE TO NEW US POLICY FORMULATIONS OUT OF CONTEXT. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO SET IT IN A PRE-ARRANGED SCENARIO LEADING TO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS.

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7. MURPHY NOTED THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF OTHER ARAB STATES AND HAD TALKED OF VISITING ARAB CAPITALS WITH ZAID RIFAI. KING HASSAN REMAINED FURIOUS AT THE JORDAN/PLO AGREEMENT WHICH QUOTE DISHONoured UNQUOTE THE FEZ DECLARATION. THE SAUDIS WERE NOT PREPARED TO EXPRESS PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR KING HUSSEIN, WHILE CONTINUING TO SAY THAT THEY LOOKED TO THE US TO DO SOMETHING. KING HUSSEIN HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD BE GOING TO MOSCOW BUT THAT GROMYKO HAD REFUSED TO RECEIVE HIM IF HE WERE ACCOMPANIED BY A PALESTINIAN.

8. MURPHY REPEATED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE GENUINELY ANXIOUS TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH EGYPT BEFORE EMBARKING ON DISCUSSIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN. BUT THIS PROCESS WAS GOING MORE SLOWLY THAN HAD BEEN HOPED. SUBJECT TO AN ISRAELI INNER CABINET DECISION TODAY ON THE AGENDA, KIMCHE AND TAMIR WOULD BE MEETING THE EGYPTIANS IN CAIRO ON 5 MAY. PERES FAVOURED A LIMITED AGENDA - TABA, THE RETURN OF THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR AND CERTAIN TRADE, TOURISM AND MEDIA ISSUES. SHAMIR THOUGHT IT NECESSARY TO REVIEW ALL EGYPTIAN SHORTCOMINGS: IN HIS VIEW ISRAEL NEEDED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY NOT NEW COMMITMENTS. MURPHY HOPED THAT MUBARAK WOULD RECOGNISE THAT JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN CONCERNS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO OVERLOAD HIS BILATERAL AGENDA WITH THE ISRAELIS. THE EGYPTIANS HAD AGREED TO A NUMBER OF ISRAELI DEMANDS (A RENEWED SEARCH FOR THE DAKAR SUBMARINE AND ACCESS TO AN ISLAND OFF TABA) BUT IMPLEMENTATION, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA, REMAINED A PROBLEM. MURPHY CONCLUDED THAT IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITH EGYPT WOULD GIVE AN IMPORTANT BOOST TO PERES AND PUT HIM IN A BETTER POSITION TO GET INVOLVED IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

WRIGHT AND HUSSEIN.

DETAIL

2. MINISTRY CALLED ON MURPHY TO REVIEW THE WAY AHEAD.

NNNN SAID THAT HE WAS DESCRIBING HIS TRIP AS NEITHER A SUCCESS

OR A FAILURE. HE HAD RETURNED TO JERUSALEM AND INTENDED TO RETURN