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17

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

*A very important
Telegram
copy.*

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR GOODALL
MR JENKINS
MR WESTON
MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST ✓

MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) } MOD
~~MR NPS~~ }
DACU }

HD/DEFENCE D
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET D

RESIDENT CLERK

mo

15.1.85

PP TOKYO

IMMEDIATE

GRS 2000

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKDEL NATO 241700Z APR 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 127 OF 24 APRIL

AND TO MODUK (FOR DACU AND D NUCPOL/SY) WASHINGTON PARIS

BONN MOSCOW

INFO PRIORITY BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LISBON

LUXEMBOURG OSLO MADRID REYKJAVIK UKDEL VIENNA

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BUCHAREST BUDAPEST EAST BERLIN PRAGUE SOFIA

WARSAW TOKYO

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US/SOVIET GENEVA TALKS: BRIEFING TO NAC

SUMMARY.

1. THE CHIEF US NEGOTIATORS GAVE A COMPREHENSIVE BRIEFING TO THE COUNCIL THIS MORNING ON THE FIRST ROUND OF US/SOVIET TALKS IN GENEVA. THE TALKS HAD GONE AS EXPECTED: THE US SIDE HAD FULLY EXPLAINED THEIR POSITION IN THE AREAS OF DEFENCE AND SPACE, STRATEGIC WEAPONS, AND INTERMEDIATE WEAPONS, AND HAD PROBED HARD FOR SIGNS OF MOVEMENT OR FLEXIBILITY, WITH LITTLE RESULT. THE SOVIET POSITION APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN LARGELY DESIGNED FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION, WITH HEAVY INSISTENCE ON THE BANNING OF "SPACE STRIKE ARMS" AS THE PRECONDITION FOR PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS. THIS SUBJECT HAD DOMINATED THEIR APPROACH, ALTHOUGH THEY INDICATED THAT AN APPROPRIATE AGREEMENT ON INF (I.E. ON THEIR TERMS) MIGHT BE REACHED INDEPENDENTLY OF AGREEMENT ON SPACE. THEIR INF AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROPOSALS SHOWED SOME REGRESSION FROM THE END 1983 POSITION. THE US SIDE HAD BEEN ABLE TO EXPOSE THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE MORATORIUM PROPOSAL. DESPITE THE LACK OF MOVEMENT, THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE TALKS HAD BEEN CORDIAL AND QUITE BUSINESS-LIKE. THE SECOND ROUND IS DUE TO START ON 30 MAY. PARTICULAR EMPHASIS WAS GIVEN TO THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFIDENTIALITY.

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DETAIL.

2. BEGINNING WITH A GENERAL OVERVIEW, KAMPELMAN SAID THERE HAD BEEN FIVE JOINT PLENARY SESSIONS, THREE AT THE OUTSET, ONE MIDWAY, AND ONE FINAL. THE US SIDE HAD ACHIEVED A FUNCTIONAL SEPARATION OF THE THREE NEGOTIATING AREAS, WITH THE SEPARATE GROUPS MEETING REGULARLY AT LEAST ONCE A WEEK. IN THE OPENING PLENARIES THE US HAD STRESSED THEIR PRIORITY TASKS FOR THE TALKS: THE EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONRY, WITH EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS FOR SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS AS STEPS ALONG THIS ROUTE: HALTING THE EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY- SETTING OUT THE US STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS- AND THE IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION AND STRICT COMPLIANCE. THE INITIAL SOVIET LINE HAD BEEN TOUGH AND RIGID, THE MAIN OBJECTIVE BEING TO DISCREDIT THE SDI. AGREEMENTS IN ALL AREAS WERE TO BE CONDITIONAL ON BANNING "SPACE STRIKE ARMS". KARPOV HAD DECLARED THAT CONTINUATION OF THE SDI WOULD WRECK THE ABM TREATY AND "TORPEDO" THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD STRESSED THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THREE AREAS, AND EMPHASISED THAT PROGRESS IN START WOULD BE CONDITIONAL ON RESOLUTION OF THE INF ISSUE. ON 19 MARCH THEY INTRODUCED THE MORATORIUM PROPOSAL. THE US SIDE HAD RESPONDED TO THIS IN THE SEPARATE GROUPS, AND BY THE END OF THE SESSION BELIEVED THAT IT HAD BEEN STRIPPED OF CREDIBILITY. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD LATER INDICATED THAT AGREEMENT TO THE MORATORIUM WAS NOT A PRECONDITION FOR MOVEMENT ELSEWHERE. HOWEVER THEIR POSITION REMAINED PREDOMINANTLY PROPAGANDISTIC. THE US SIDE BELIEVED THAT THE TONE HAD IMPROVED BY THE END OF THE ROUND, AND HOPED THAT SERIOUS SOVIET PROPOSALS WOULD EMERGE SUBSEQUENTLY. HOWEVER, LONG AND DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS WERE CLEARLY IN PROSPECT. KAMPELMAN STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFIDENTIALITY, WHICH APPLIED IN PARTICULAR TO THE NEGOTIATORS THEMSELVES, PERHAPS LESS TO POLITICIANS, IN CAPITALS (HE ADDED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME INDICATIONS OF SOVIET ABUSE OF THIS AGREEMENT) AND ASKED THAT THE BRIEFING OF THE COUNCIL BE TREATED IN THIS LIGHT.

3. IN THE GROUP ON DEFENCE AND SPACE, THE US HAD SET OUT THEIR VIEW THAT PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS HAD FAILED TO FULFIL THE PROMISE OF CURTAILING THE RACE IN OFFENSIVE ARMS. EFFECTIVE DEFENSES, IF THEY MET THE STRICT CRITERIA SET OUT, COULD PROVIDE A SOUNDER BASIS FOR DETERRENCE. THE US HOPED THAT SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENCE PROGRAMMES REFLECTED A SIMILAR INTEREST WHICH COULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR DIALOGUE. THE EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY SHOULD BE SEEN IN THIS LIGHT (THEY HAD DRAWN ATTENTION TO SPECIFIC ISSUES OF NON-COMPLIANCE).

4. THE CORE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS A MORATORIUM, TO BE FOLLOWED BY A BAN ON RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, AND DEPLOYMENT OF SPACE STRIKE ARMS DEFINED BY THE SOVIETS AS QUOTE SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS OF ANY PRINCIPLE OF ACTION SPECIALLY DEVELOPED OR APPROPRIATELY CONVERTED, TESTED OR BEING TESTED, TO STRIKE OBJECTS IN SPACE OR OBJECTS ON EARTH OR IN THE ATMOSPHERE FROM SPACE UNQUOTE. THIS DEFINITION WOULD EXCLUDE BOTH LONG RANGE MISSILES WHICH TRAVEL THROUGH SPACE AND A NUMBER OF SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF ATTACKING OBJECTS IN SPACE, SUCH AS GROUND-

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LONG RANGE MISSILES WHICH TRAVEL THROUGH SPACE AND A NUMBER OF SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF ATTACKING OBJECTS IN SPACE, SUCH AS GROUND-BASED ABM INTERCEPTORS (EG THE MOSCOW ABM SYSTEM), MISSILE MODIFIED TO ATTACK OBJECTS IN SPACE, AND GROUND BASED DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS. THIS WAS BECAUSE THE DEFINITION WAS BASED ON INTENT RATHER THAN CAPABILITY. THE US CRITIQUE HAD DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE DIFFICULTIES OF A COMPREHENSIVE BAN OF SPACE ARMS, AND THE ONE-SIDEDNESS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS. IN THE US VIEW THEY WERE NOT SERIOUSLY MEANT.

5. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD DISMISSED US ARGUMENTS ON THE UNVERIFIABILITY OF RESEARCH, AGAIN BASING THEIR POSITION ON INTENT. SUCH A VIEW WAS EQUALLY ONE-SIDED, THE US RESEARCH PROGRAMME BEING OPEN. THE SOVIETS HAD ACCUSED THE US OF DEVIATING FROM THE 8 JANUARY JOINT STATEMENT BY REFUSING TO ACCEPT THE BAN. THE US HAD RESPONDED THAT THEY COMPLETELY ACCEPTED THE STATEMENT AS THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION, AND THE SOVIETS WERE DEVIATING FROM IT BY THEIR EXCESSIVE EMPHASIS ON "SPACE STRIKE ARMS" IN ISOLATION.

6. THERE HAD BEEN SOME POSITIVE ASPECTS. BOTH SIDES HAD CLEARLY EXPLAINED THEIR POSITION, AND TOWARDS THE END THE SOVIET SIDE HAD INFORMALLY ADDRESSED THE OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE RELATIONSHIP. SOVIET PROPOSALS HAD BEEN EXPOSED TO A CAREFUL CRITIQUE. NONETHELESS, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT TO USE PUBLIC PRESSURE TO UNDERMINE THE US POSITION. IN THIS RESPECT THE LUXEMBOURG NPG COMMUNIQUE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY USEFUL.

7. REPORTING ON THE INF GROUP GLITMAN SAID THAT SOVIET PROPOSALS HAD BEEN ON PREDICTABLE LINES: EQUATION OF GLCM AND PERSHING III WITH SOVIET "COUNTER MEASURES" - FULL EQUIVALENCE WITH UK AND FRENCH FORCES - LIMITS ON AIRCRAFT - AND THREE PROPOSALS FOR MORATORIA. THE UNITED STATES HAD PUT FORWARD THE AGREED ALLIANCE POSITION ON THE ZERO/ZERO AND INTERIM OPTIONS, AND HAD PROBED THE SOVIET POSITION. IN INFORMAL EXCHANGES THE SOVIET SIDE HAD INDICATED THAT AN APPROPRIATE AGREEMENT ON INF COULD BE REACHED INDEPENDENTLY OF THE OTHER TWO AREAS.

8. IN ADDITION TO THE GENERAL MORATORIUM, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD PROPOSED A BILATERAL MORATORIUM ON INF AS A "GESTURE OF GOODWILL" AS WELL AS ANNOUNCING THEIR UNILATERAL MORATORIUM ON SS20 DEPLOYMENT UNTIL NOVEMBER 1985. THEY HAD HOWEVER BEEN UNABLE TO ANSWER DETAILED QUESTIONS ON THIS LATTER PROPOSAL, INCLUDING THE NUMBER AT WHICH SS20S WOULD BE FROZEN. THEIR PROPOSALS ON AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN UNSPECIFIC, BUT WERE PROBABLY A STEP BACK FROM THE NOVEMBER 1983 POSITION, AS WAS THEIR POSITION ON DEPLOYMENT EAST OF THE URALS. SOVIET PROPOSALS ON MISSILE REDUCTION WOULD STILL LEAVE THEM WITH A MONOPOLY IN THIS CATEGORY: THEY HAD BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO ALLOW THE MORATORIUM TO APPEAR AS TACIT ACCEPTANCE OF US DEPLOYMENT. THIS THEREFORE REMAINED THE KEY ISSUE.

9. ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS, TOWER REPORTED THAT VERY LITTLE HAD BEEN REVEALED OF THE SUBSTANTIVE SOVIET POSITION. THERE HAD BEEN SOME REGRESSION FROM THEIR END 1983 POSITION, PARTICULARLY IN RESPECT OF CRUISE MISSILES. THEY HAD PROPOSED A QUANTITATIVE FREEZE ON STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND WARHEADS, BUT NOT QUALITATIVE RESTRAINTS. THE US HAD PRESENTED THEIR OVERALL CONCEPTUAL APPROACH.

STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND WARHEADS, BUT NOT QUALITATIVE RESTRAINTS. THE US HAD PRESENTED THEIR OVERALL CONCEPTUAL APPROACH, AND STRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER SOVIET PROPOSALS AND TO TRADE OFF AREAS OF RELEVANT ADVANTAGE. THE SOVIETS HAD SHOWN LITTLE INTEREST. THE US ALSO PROPOSED A SEPARATE SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE.

10. RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS FROM THE GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE, KAMPELMAN SAID THAT THERE WAS SOME SHIFT FROM SOVIET INSISTENCE ON AGREEMENT ON SPACE AS A PRECONDITION TO ALL ELSE. IT WAS NO LONGER A PRECONDITION TO SERIOUS TALKS, AND POSSIBLY NOT TO INF AGREEMENT. IT STILL REMAINED A PRECONDITION TO AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS. THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE ON CO-OPERATION IN STRATEGIC DEFENCE RESEARCH, NOR DESIRE TO REVIEW THE RELATIONSHIP. CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED: THERE HAD BEEN SOME UNDERMINING OF THIS BY THE SOVIET SIDE, BUT NOT SERIOUSLY. PROPAGANDA CLEARLY REMAINED A KEY INGREDIENT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES. TOWER AND GLITMAN HAD MADE CLEAR THEY WOULD INSIST ON TIGHT LANGUAGE ON VERIFICATION, AND THE LATTER FORESAW SOME NEED TO GO BEYOND NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

11. IT ASKED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY SOVIET RESPONSE TO US COMPLAINTS OF VIOLATIONS OF THE ABM TREATY OR TO US PROBING ON COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF, ANY INDICATION OF ULTIMATE ACCEPTANCE OF SOME US LRINF DEPLOYMENT, AND WHETHER THE QUESTION OF A BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTS HAD BEN RAISED. OTHER PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES ASKED ABOUT SALT AND ABM TREATY COMPLIANCE ISSUES, SLCMS, PUBLIC PRESENTATION, AND THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

12. KAMPELMAN REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THE OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE RELATIONSHIP HAD BEEN MINIMAL, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD BEGUN TO RECOGNISE THE PROBLEM. THEY HAD NOT REACTED TO US ASSERTIONS ABOUT SOVIET RESEARCH ACTIVITY. KAMPELMAN STRESSED THAT THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO ABIDE BY THE ABM TREATY, AND THAT A RECENT IHT REPORT OF PENTAGON STATEMENT WAS OVER-SIMPLIFIED AND FAULTY. THE SOVIETS HAD DENIED ANY NON-COMPLIANCE. HOWEVER, THE US ACCUSATIONS THAT THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR WAS A CLEAR BREACH STOOD. IT WAS NOT A CONCLUSION THE PRESIDENT HAD REACHED WITH ENTHUSIASM. US CONCERNS ABOUT THIS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES HAD BEEN CLEARLY STATED. THE US HAD ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT SDI RESEARCH WOULD CONTINUE.

13. TOWER SAID THAT A MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTS HAD NOT BEEN PROPOSED, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET SIDE HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF US NON-RATIFICATION OF THE TTBT. SLCMS HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE SOVIET MORATORIUM PROPOSAL AND IN THEIR PROPOSED BAN ON CRUISE MISSILES WITH MORE THAN 600 KM RANGE. ON LRINF GLITMAN SAID THAT IT WAS TOO SOON TO JUDGE WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD ACCEPT ANY US DEPLOYMENT: THEY HAD NOT YET DONE SO. THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF NUMBERS AND NO RESPONSE ON COLLATERAL RESTRAINTS. ON GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION THEY HAD STEPPED BACK FROM THE NOVEMBER 1983. HOWEVER, THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN GOOD, AND LESS TENSE THAN IN 1983.

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14. ROUND TWO WILL BEGIN ON 30 MAY, AND CONTINUE TO 16 JULY.
THE THIRD ROUND IS PROVISIONALLY AGREED FOR MID-SEPTEMBER.

15. FULL TEXTS OF OPENING STATEMENTS FOLLOW BY BAG FOR FCO,
MODUK, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS.

GRAHAM

NNNN

SENT/RCVD AT 241851Z PB/ EJM