



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

London

For. Pol. (2)

Prime Minister

A.J.C. 24/11

November 20, 1982

Resident Clerk
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
London, S. W. 1

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Dear Resident Clerk:

I would appreciate your transmitting the enclosed
message from Secretary of State Shultz to Foreign
Secretary Pym which was received at the Embassy
this morning.

Sincerely,

Edward W. Lillin (dut. officer)
for John J. Louis, Jr.
Ambassador

Enclosure:
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SECRET

Dear Francis:

Thank you for your thoughtful message of November 17 on recent steps in East-West relations.

I appreciate your efforts to bring our French friends back into line in our East-West economic discussions. We very much hope that these problems have been ironed out, and are anxious, as you, to move ahead to implement the steps agreed upon in the non-paper.

Your idea of a declaration on East-West relations is an interesting one. I agree that we need a firm and positive restatement of the basic Western approach to relations with the Soviet Union in December's NATO Communique, but I have reservations about our expanding this into a separate declaration. It is certainly too early to draw any conclusions about Soviet behavior in the post-Brezhnev era. I am also concerned that a hurried effort to agree upon such a document could create a counter-productive debate within the alliance, with some governments seeking to take a more hopeful and positive line than circumstances yet dictate. I believe, therefore, that we should in December content ourselves with a solid reaffirmation of Western policies, as put forward in recent Alliance documents, holding the possibility of a broader document in reserve for some future occasion.

Regarding the possibility of a U. S.-Soviet Summit, we remain ready to move toward such a meeting provided that it is well prepared and that there are reasons to believe that it would be productive. I do not rule out the possibility that the change in Soviet leadership could create a situation in which such a meeting might be productive. To be honest, however, there has been nothing in our exchanges to date with the Soviets which suggests this to be the case. I therefore believe that any call on our part for such a Summit would be premature.

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I look very much forward to seeing you next month both in Brussels and for more extended discussions in London. The quadripartite dinner and our bilateral talks will provide an occasion to discuss the issues your message raises in detail, and to begin forging a Western strategy for dealing with the new Soviet leadership. As always, I very much value your thoughts on these subjects.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

/s/ George P. Shultz

George P. Shultz

SECRET

070
17 November 1982



With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

(B J P Fall)

We spoke.

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH**

A J Coles Esq

DRAFT LETTER

FROM: SECRETARY OF STATE

TO: MR SHULTZ

1. I have been thinking about the conversation we had in Moscow when we were both there for President Brezhnev's funeral and about the prospects for East/West relations.

2. Three things strike me:

(a) There have been significant shifts in the last week in the scenery of East/West relations - Brezhnev has died and been replaced by Andropov, which in turn gave the opportunity for the signal contained in President Reagan's message of condolence and for the important conversation which Vice President Bush and you had with Andropov and Gromyko after the funeral.

(b) There has been a growing convergence of attitudes towards East/West relations among the major Western Allies.

/This was

This was for example reflected in the joint statement issued by President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl;

- (c) The successful conclusion of the pipeline exercise on the basis of your 'non-paper' has created both the opportunity and the urgent necessity for the Western allies to concert a common line on East/West relations, including but not merely the economic dimension.

3. It is very important that we should seize the chance which I believe these developments offer to us, and not to lose a day more than is necessary. There is very little time before the December NATO Foreign Ministers meeting, which will obviously be exceptionally important this year. I should like to see that meeting adopt, in addition to the usual communique, a Declaration on East/West Relations, setting out in an eloquent and eye-catching form the basic Western approach, and repeating the various offers and proposals already made to the Soviet Union, so as to bring out President Reagan's point that a more constructive East/West relationship is there for the asking if the new Soviet leaders will only do what is necessary to grasp the opportunity. Such a Declaration would no doubt have to be drafted by an inner group of Allies rather than in the usual NATO drafting machinery.

4. At the same time, I also hope that we can move ahead rapidly on East/West economic relations. The French problem has, I hope, been largely ironed out as a result of a meeting I had in Moscow with Claude Cheysson and the others concerned. We ourselves take very seriously all our commitments in the 'non-paper', and have clear ideas on how to pursue them. I have sent instructions to Oliver Wright to help maintain the momentum.

5. One point struck me as being of particular interest in your Ambassador's account of your meeting with Andropov. I gather that Andropov dropped a hint about a possible Summit. In normal times I would go along with the argument that Summits need to be very carefully prepared if they are not to arouse and then disappoint public expectations. But in present circumstances, and with all the changes in the East/West scenery of which I have spoken, it seems to me that there could be a good deal to be said for going for an early Soviet-American Summit. It could be presented not as an attempt to reach comprehensive agreements but as a chance for the two leaders to get to know one another, and also to enable President Reagan, as leader of the Western Alliance, to spell out to Andropov the major areas of Western concern - the strategic balance, Afghanistan, Poland and human rights. Like the Declaration on East/West relations which I have suggested, this would help to underline the point that a more constructive relationship is possible if the Russians want it. Ideally the Summit would follow soon after the NATO meeting, for example early next year.

6. I have considered the possible effect of a Summit on European public opinion, and in particular the risk that it might arouse illusions about a better East/West relationship which would make it more difficult to go ahead with INF deployment. But I believe that, providing it were held really early in 1983, a Summit could help to keep public opinion steady - perhaps especially in Germany - by demonstrating that the United States is doing everything possible to reach agreement on genuinely balanced measures of arms control, at the same time as putting the other half of the double decision into effect.

7. To put the idea in another form, would the President be able to reject a summit if Andropov were to propose one now, as could happen after the Warsaw Pact meeting early next month? If the answer is no, perhaps the right course is for the United States itself to take the initiative.

8. I have discussed this message with the Prime Minister, and it reflects her thinking as well as my own. I have not so far had an opportunity to talk the matter over with Claude and Hans-Dietrich, but would like to do so when I see them on 22-23 November at one of our regular Community meetings. I hope you will be able to let me have your reaction before then.